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More than ten years after the seminal paper by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) 
modeling the impact of skills on remigration the empirical evidence on that 
theory is still mixed. Our paper is to shed light on that issue. Using the 
GSOEP we test two hypotheses derived from Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) 
while allowing for endogeneity of host country specific capital. Our results 
give strong support for their theory. Additionally a sensitivity analysis shows 
that the insignificance of education in previous studies is due to the test 
design conducted and cannot be interpreted as falsification of Borjas’ and 
Bratsberg’s (1996) theory. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Considering demographic change in Western European countries it is rather important to understand 
migration flows. Until now 70 million inhabitants in Europe have migrated internationally at least once 
(UC Davis (2010)). In order to evaluate the economic impact of migration for sending and receiving 
regions it is necessary to recognize the selection processes driving in- and outmigration. In particular 
understanding remigration is crucial to design and evaluate cohort related politics in the host countries 
concerned. 
The thriving literature on this subject refers conceptually to the seminal paper by Borjas and Bratsberg 
(1996). Their model explicitly takes reversible migration into account. The authors describe the individual 
remigration decision primarily as a function of individual skills. They argue that the rate of return to skills 
in the source country relative to that in the host country determines the nature of selection. If the return 
to skills are relatively low (high) in the source country well (poorly) educated people will be prone to 
migrate to the host country. Selection in immigration is accentuated by complementary selection in 
outmigration. “The immigrants who remain in the host country are ‘the best of the best’ if there is 
positive selection, and the ‘worst of the worst’ if there is negative selection” (Borjas and Bratsberg 
(1996)). 
The empirical literature referring to Borjas’ and Bratsberg’s (1996) theory concentrates on the analysis of 
remigration. Although there is a vast literature the empirical evidence on that issue remains nebulous 
and even the existence of the effect of skills on remigration is questionable thus far (Constant and 
Massey (2003)). On the one hand, using macro-level data of the United States Borjas and Bratsberg 
(1996) find supportive as well as contrary evidence for their model stated. On the other hand, there are 
many micro-level studies finding no significant effect of skills on return migration (Reagan and Olson 
(2000), Constant and Massey (2002), Constant and Massey (2003), Dustmann (2003), Kirdar (2009)).
1 An 
excellent synopsis of the literature on return migration can be found in Constant and Massey (2003). 
Our inquiry is to shed light on the impact of skills on remigration flows by using German micro-level data. 
For this undertaking it is useful to distinguish a weak and a strong deduction from the seminal Borjas and 
Bratsberg (1996) model. The weak one states that the kind of the underlying selection process  (positive 
or negative selection) determines the effect of skills on the remigration d ecision and, thus, is country-
specific. The strong one additionally states the direction of that effect to be positive in the case of 
negative selection and negative in the case of positive selection. 
We contribute to the existing literature in several aspects. Some of them exemplified below may explain 
the  conflicting  results  of  the  aforementioned  studies.  Firstly,  testing  empirically  more  powerful 
hypotheses usually goes along with tougher data requirements.  In the case of Borjas’ and Bratsberg’s 
                                                           
1 The  studies  cited  above  differ  regarding  the  estimation  technique  conducted  and  the  definition  of  the 
endogenous variable as well as the measurement of skills or  ability. Furthermore, there are many studies not 
mentioned  analyzing  remigration  flows  between  two  particular  countries  with  mixed  results  as  discussed  in 
Constant and Massey (2003). The latter approach heavily depends on the assumption of time constant return to 
skills ratios for the countries considered. - 3 - 
 
theory  (1996)  (and  depending  on  the  level  of  aggregation)  the  measurement  of  country  specific 
outmigration rates, the return to skills ratios between host and source countries over time, and the 
amount of transferable skills is especially challenging. By separating the theoretical insights of Borjas and 
Bratsberg (1996) in a weak and a strong hypothesis we clarify the empirical content of the theoretical 
statements under consideration and thus are able to test each of them with just the data requirements 
necessary. Secondly, our econometric analysis explicitly allows for endogeneity of host country specific 
capital as argued by DaVanzo (1983) and Dustmann (1996). We provide an in-depth discussion on that 
issue and estimate a so-called type II model which describes the return migration as a function of the 
actual amount of the country specific capital instead of the latent propensity to accumulate it. Finally, in 
order to ensure the robustness of our results and the comparability with previous studies we perform an 
extensive sensitivity analysis. We not only incorporate the most relevant formulation of the Borjas and 
Bratsberg  (1996)  model  in  previous  research,  but  also  use  different  kinds  of  endogenous  variables 
discussed in the literature. In the course of this analysis we revisit the conflicting previous results and 
shed some light on their occurrence.  
Based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) we find strong and robust evidence for the weak 
hypothesis of Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) formulated above. Additionally there is some evidence for the 
strong hypothesis as well. Moreover, most of the other factors supposed to determine return migration 
are in line with previous literature. Our results indicate that endogeneity has to be taken into account in 
order to avoid misspecification error if one relies on return intentions. Lastly, the sensitivity analysis 
performed  in  this  study  suggests  that,  according  to  Borjas  and  Bratsberg  (1996),  the  theoretically 
unexpected insignificance of education on return migration is due to the common formulation of Borjas’ 
and Bratsberg’s (1996) model in the literature and should not be interpreted as an empirical falsification 
of their theory. 
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe our empirical implementation of the 
theory by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) and address data measurement issues for both stages of our two 
stage approach in general. In the third section we present the data used in our study. Econometric issues 
are discussed in the fourth section of the paper. In section five the results are given and their sensitivity 
to alternative specifications is considered. A final section concludes. 
 
2.  Empirical Implementation 
As mentioned above, to assess the impact of skills on the individual return migration decision we refer to 
Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) and distinguish a weak and a strong hypothesis. In their seminal paper they 
model the individual remigration probability and state that there is a selection process on skills, this 
process is country-specific, and the type of selection depends on the ratio of the return to skills between 
the  source  and  the  host  country.  To  test  the  entire  empirical  proposition  of  this  theory  we  need 
information about the ratio of return to skills for all source countries. These measures commonly suffer 
from substantial error. To avoid this potential error it seems useful to reduce the empirical content of 
the hypothesis tested. We therefore define the weak hypothesis to be: 
(H1)  The effect of skills on the return migration decision does vary over source countries. - 4 - 
 
This so-called weak hypothesis is nested in the strong one which additionally states the type of the 
selection under consideration. We therefore define: 
(H2)  If the return to skills in the source country are greater (smaller) than those in Germany 
the effect of skills on the return migration decision is positive (negative). 
By using micro-level data we model the individual return migration decision (return ) i  as follows. We 
observe  1, ,   iN  individuals  from  1, , jJ    source  countries.  According  to  Borjas’  and  Bratsberg’s 
(1996) model Equation (1a) depicts the weak hypothesis and the more restrictive Equation (1b) the 
strong one, respectively. 
(1a)  , return  =  skills skills ,                i j j i W j i W j i i j i
jj
D D C I S          
(1b)  return  =  skills skills .                i j j i S i S i i j i
j
D T C I S          
Where  , , , , , , , , , j W S W j          S                and   denote parameters indexed for the weak and the strong 
hypothesis  respectively  and  i   and  i   are  i.i.d.  error  components.  In  both  equations  the  selection 
process  formulated  by  Borjas  and  Bratsberg  (1996)  is  captured  by  the  interaction  terms  involving 
individual skills (skills ) i . 
The interaction term between skills and country-specific dummy variables ( skills ) ji D   in Equation (1a) 
formalizes the weak hypothesis and thus allows for country-specific skill effects. If the weak hypothesis 
(H1)  by Borjas  and  Bratsberg is true
2 we will observe differences between the scalar parameter  W   
which  is the  skill  effect  for  the  base  group, and  the  ones  for  individuals  from other  countries.  The 
differences are measured by the parameters  , Wj  . The joint test for all  , Wj   can be interpreted as testing 
the weak hypothesis (H1), where the null hypothesis is that it does not hold. 
The empirically more ambitious strong hypothesis (H2) is tested in Equation (1b) where the variable T 
reflects the idea of different types of selection mechanism. T can be designed in multiple ways. For the 
time being let T separate source countries into two groups, distinguishing the countries with greater 
return to skills   1 T   from the ones with smaller return to skills   0 T   relative to Germany. Another, 
more ambitious, way to think about T is to assume that it measures the standardized difference between 
the  return  to  skills  in  the  host  country    Germany r and  the  source  country    source r  metrically 
     source Germany Germany T r r r  and, hence, is distributed around zero. In this case by interacting skills and T 
we implicitly assume a linear relationship between the impact of skills on remigration and T. According to 
Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) in either case we expect to find a positively signed scalar parameter  S  . In 
what follows we use both concepts of T. 
                                                           
2 It also is necessary that the host countries differ over the sample with respect to their return to skills. - 5 - 
 
All  other  possible  source  country  specific  selection  processes  are  captured  by  the  source  country 
characteristics ( j S ) and the level shift parameters  j  . 
To account for individual specific variables determining the return migration decision we include socio-
demographic characteristics of two kinds in both equations. In line with the existing literature we choose 
a set of exogenous variables   i I . Furthermore, we include variables measuring locally tied capital   i C  
in the model. These location specific assets can hardly be utilized after remigration and their liquidation 
induces high transaction cost. That is why we generally expect negative effects of host country specific 
capital on the return migration decision. At this point the problem of endogeneity arises. In general, we 
follow the reasoning in DaVanzo (1983) and Dustmann (1996) who conjecture that host country specific 
capital   i C  is determined simultaneously with the individual return migration decisions, but there is 
one important distinction. 
For reasoning simultaneity DaVanzo (1983) and Dustmann (1996) implicitly have to rely on the concept 
of  proneness  to  accumulate  such  location  specific  capital. We,  on  the  contrary,  assume  that  the 
proneness to accumulate this kind of capital does not determine the outmigration decision, for the 
proneness is not region specific. For example, it is not the proneness to own a house that determines the 
return migration decision it is the fact that an individual owns a house or not. Hence, the intended return 
of individual i in period t is influenced only by the amount of social capital in period t. Although the 
proneness is correlated with that amount it alone does not affect anyone’s remigration decision. In 
contrast to the amount, the proneness is mobile. To sum up, the proneness to remigrate in period t-1 
affects the proneness to accumulate location specific capital in period t as well as the proneness to 
remigrate in period t. So, we decide to model endogeneity rather than simultaneity. The corresponding 
estimation technique is a type II model which allows us to include endogenous dummy regressors rather 
than their reduced form predictions. A detailed discussion on this topic can be found in the section 
Econometric Issues. 
 
3.  Operationalizing the Variables 
Our  empirical  analysis  is  based  on  a  nationally  representative  data  set  for  Germany,  the  German 
Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP)
3. It includes many relevant socio-economic variables and also oversamples 
immigrants, thus providing a large sample. The existing literature takes advantage of those features since 
a vast majority is based on GSOEP data. This fact also ensures the comparability of our results. 
Measuring the endogenous variable, namely the return migration decision, is a well discussed issue in 
the existing literature.  One strand of the existing empirical studies approximates the individual return 
migration  decision  modeled by Borjas and  Bratsberg  (1996)  using the intended returns (Dustmann 
(1996), Steiner and Velling (1994)). Another strand argues that this approach can be improved by using 
the actual return moves (Constant and Massey (2003)). Employing the return intention is theoretically 
                                                           
3 The data used in this publication were made available by the German Socio Economic Panel Study (SOEP) at the 
German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin. (Wagner, Frick and Schupp (2007)). - 6 - 
 
more  appealing  because  human  behavior  is  guided  by  this  ontologically  subjective  category.  The 
advantage of the latter concept is that solely actual return migration is relevant to politics. Yet, there are 
several shortcomings of the actual return concept. Since it is necessary to follow the same individuals for 
numerous years in order to figure out whether they return or not, panel attrition becomes a problem. 
Moreover one needs to assume that the ratio of return to skills and other country-specific characteristics 
remain unaltered (for a detailed discussion of this problem see Barrett and Trace (1998)). Since the 
GSOEP  provides  both  measures  we  ensure  comparability  to  central  aforementioned  studies  and 
underpin the political relevance of our analysis by using both concepts.
4 Therefore, we do not use the 
latest GSOEP wave providing intended returns and rely on the 2000 survey instead.
5 
The following question measures return intentions.  
 
Do you want to stay in Germany forever? [GSOEP Code qp133] 
(yes/no) 
 
We generate a dummy variable indicating individuals that answer no. The actual returns are generated 
as follows. In the GSOEP the reason for individual non-response is documented. We follow previous 
research and generate a dummy variable indicating a realized return within the time span from 2001 to 
2007 using the non-response item moved abroad. Due to panel attrition the problem of sample selection 
arises as pointed out by Constant and Massey (2003). We address this problem below. 
Another  crucial  issue  for  testing  the  hypotheses  stated  above  is  to  measure  the  skills  driving  the 
selection process. Borjas’ and Bratsberg’s (1996) theoretical model refers to transferable skills only. Non-
transferable skills get lost when migrating and, hence, have to be considered as migration costs.
6 In line 
with the existing literature  we assume that formal education is transferable and neglect transferable 
skills beyond formal education. Thus, we measure skills as years of education. 
                                                           
4 Since we use the GSOEP both approaches suffer from the fact that it is impossible to tell whether a former 
immigrant remigrates or moves to a third country as mentioned by DaVanzo (1983). The potential advantage of the 
return intention approach is weakened in the GSOEP because the interviewee is just asked whether he wants to 
stay in Germany forever or not. So, the existing studies as well as this inquiry assume that outmigrants are return 
migrants, which as Hunt (2004) points out is not a tough restriction. 
5 We perform a cross section analysis because the return intention is solely available in few waves. Thus , a classical 
panel data analysis is not feasible. 
6 A detailed discussion on that issue can be found  in Chiswick and Miller (2009). They show that the individual 
probability  of  being  undereducated  or  overeducated  can  mainly  be  explained  by  individual  characteristics 
controlled for in our study like years since migration, marital status, and language profi ciency. The possibly 
problematic issue of country specific depreciation rates for transferred skills seems to be weakened by their results.  - 7 - 
 
As depicted in Equation (1a) testing the weak hypothesis relies on interactions between source country 
dummy variables and individual skills. We construct a total of thirteen source country dummies.
7 For 
testing the strong hypothesis provided in Equation (1b) we implement further constraints  by imputing 
information about the type of the selection process .  As mentioned above there are two ways to 
construct T for our undertaking. In both cases we have to proxy the ratio of return to skills between the 
source country and Germany. Ideally one could measure the return to transferable skills by the return to 
schooling as suggested by Rooth and Sareela (2007). Yet, besides that these data are hardly available for 
all source countries and the year 2000, a full set of restrictive assumptions is required just for measuring 
return to schooling (a brief discussion can be found in Björklund and Kjellström (2002)). That is why, we 
follow  Borjas  and  Bratsberg  (1996)
 8 by  making  use  of  income  inequality,  concretely  the  Gini  index, 
instead.
9 We generate a nominally scaled T indicating countries with higher return to skills than Germany 
and a metrically scaled T assumed to measure the standardized difference between the return to skills in 
the source country and Germany as defined in section 2. 
Moreover, we take advantage of the existing literature that provides an elaborate pool of covariates. 
Starting with the endogenous location specific capital we control for own house and German citizenship. 
The variables are obtained as follows. 
 
Do you live in the flat as the main tenant, subtenant, or owner? [GSOEP Code qh22] 
(owner/tenant) 
Is your nationality German? [GSOEP Code qp119] 
(yes/no) 
 
The rich SOEP data enables us to control for all major individual related covariates previously discussed 
in the literature denoted   i I  in the Equations (1a) and (1b). Finally, we enhance our micro level data by 
source country specific variables   j S . As suggested by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) we augment the 
equations explaining the return migration decision by geographical distance to the source country, a 
                                                           
7 All source  country dummies consist of at least ten observations  with at least one actual or intended return 
migrant.  Since  the  number  of  missing  observations  varies  with  the  endogenous  variable  used  we  make  use 
different country dummies for each endogenous variable.  
8 Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) use the ratio of income accruing to the top 10% of the households to th e income 
accruing to the bottom  20% of households to account for the ratio of return to skills between the host and the 
source country. 
9 The data are gathered from World Bank Development Indicators 2007. The time of their collection ranges from 
1992 to 2004. However, 50% of the data refer to the time span of 2000 to 2003. - 8 - 
 
proxy  for  political  stability,  and  GDP  per  capita.
10 Table 1 presents the definition   and  the  summary 
statistics of all variables used in this inquiry. 
Following Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) we restrict our sample by excluding all women from the sample to 
avoid the implicit assumption that the return migration process is the same for both sexes. Furthermore, 
we restrict our sample to all male immigrants of working age by our means between 18 and 65 years of 
age and not serving their community service or military service. 
                                                           
10 We use the geographical distance from the source country’s capital to Berlin, Germany. In addition, we proxy 
political stability using the sum of the political rights and the civil liberty indexes provided by the Freedom House 
Organization.  We  accessed  the  data  from:  http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439,  11
th 
September 2009. We obtain the real GDP per capita relative to the US from Heston, Summers and Aten (2009). For 
aggregated  political  entities  like  Benelux  and  Ex-Yugoslavia  we  calculate  the  population  weighted  average 
GDP/Capita, distance, and political stability proxy respectively. Furthermore, since realized returns refer to the time 
span from 2000 to 2007 we use the average value of all time varying source country specific variables denoted b) in 
Table 1. - 9 - 
 
Variable Definition    Summary Statistics 
Variable  Description  GSOEP    Mean  Sd.  Min;Max  Nobs. 
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES             
intended return  =1 if the respondent does not intend to stay in Germany  qp133    0.28  0.45  0;1  1169 
realized return  =1 if the respondent actually outmigrates until 2007  ypergz$    0.10  0.30  0;1  897 
own house   =1 if the respondent owns the flat or house he lives in   qh22    0.25  0.43  0;1  1404 
citizen  =1 if the respondent is German citizen  qp119    0.39  0.49  0;1  1404 
               
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS ( i I )             
age  age in years   gebjahr    42.14  12.51  18;65  1404 
age2  age squared  gebjahr    1932.88  1076.75  324;4225  1404 
remitsum  remittances to the source country last year in Deutsche Mark  qp66*    579.59  2322.65  0;35000  1404 
remitno  =1 if respondent is not remitting to the source country  qp66*    0.84  0.37  0;1  1404 
healthgood  =1 if self reported health is above moderate  qp95    0.57  0.49  0;1  1404 
healthmedi  =1 if self reported health is moderate (base outcome)  qp95    0.29  0.45  0;1  1404 
healthbad  =1 if self reported health is below moderate  qp95    0.13  0.34  0;1  1404 
ysm  years passed since initial migration to Germany  immiyear   19.53  10.97  0;51  1404 
unemployed  =1 if respondent is not full or part-time employed  qp10    0.29  0.46  0;1  1404 
partner_no  =1 if no partner exists  partz00    0.13  0.34  0;1  1404 
partner_german  =1 if partner lives in the household and is from Germany  partz00    0.18  0.38  0;1  1404 
partner_same  =1 if partner of same origin lives in the household (base)   partz00    0.56  0.50  0;1  1404 
partner_different  =1 if partner lives in the household and is not of same origin  partz00    0.08  0.27  0;1  1404 
partner_separated  =1 if partner not in the household and her origin is unknown  partz00    0.05  0.22  0;1  1404 
education  years of schooling (Cross National Equivalent File)  d1110900   10.68  2.34  7;18  1404 
prestige  Treiman standard international occupation prestige  siops00    27.83  18.94  0;78  1404 
readgerman  =1 if respondent solely or usually reads German newspaper  qp129    0.56  0.50  0;1  1404 
speakgerman  =1 if respondent solely or usually speaks German  qp128    0.40  0.49  0;1  1404 
children  =1 if children live in the household  qkzahl    0.52  0.50  0;1  1404 
               
SOURCE COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS ( j S )             
GDP/capita






  (a) indicates the value in 2000, (b) the average from 2000-
2007 







a),b)    sum of Freedom House Indexes (political rights and civil 
liberty); 
-    6.51
a)  3.25
a)  2;14
a)  1404 
  (a) indicates the value in 2000, (b) the sum from 2000-2007  -    39.11
b)  22.39
b)  14;98
b)  1404 
distance  distance in km from Berlin to source country’s capital   -    1903.06  1611.05  282.2;16064  1404 
T  stand. difference of gini-indexes( ( )/ )  source Germany Germany T r r r   -    0.29  0.21  -0.17;1.63  1350 
               
SOURCE COUNTRY DUMMY VARIABLES ( j D )             
turkey  =1 if respondent was born in Turkey (base group)  corigin    0.25  0.43  0;1  1404 
france  =1 if respondent was born in France  corigin    0.01  0.10  0;1  1404 
great britain  =1 if respondent was born in Great Britain  corigin    0.01  0.11  0;1  1404 
greece  =1 if respondent was born in Greece  corigin    0.05  0.22  0;1  1404 
italy  =1 if respondent was born in Italy  corigin    0.10  0.30  0;1  1404 
kasakhstan  =1 if respondent was born in Kazakhstan  corigin    0.07  0.25  0;1  1404 
poland  =1 if respondent was born in Poland  corigin    0.11  0.31  0;1  1404 
romania  =1 if respondent was born in Romania  corigin    0.03  0.17  0;1  1404 
spain  =1 if respondent was born in Spain  corigin    0.02  0.15  0;1  1404 
usa  =1 if respondent was born in the USA  corigin    0.01  0.10  0;1  1404 
africa  =1 if respondent was born in Africa  corigin    0.02  0.14  0;1  1404 
benelux  =1 if respondent was born in a BENELUX country   corigin    0.01  0.10  0;1  1404 
ex-yugoslavia  =1 if respondent was born in Ex-Yugoslavia  corigin    0.12  0.32  0;1  1404 
south america  =1 if respondent was born in South America  corigin    0.01  0.10  0;1  1404 
other  =1 if respondent was born in non of the countries above  corigin    0.19  0.39  0;1  1404 - 10 - 
 
Variable Definition    Summary Statistics 
Variable  Description  GSOEP    Mean  Sd.  Min;Max  Nobs. 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES FOR OWN HOUSE (EQUATION 2)             
married  =1 if respondent is married  qp140    0.78  0.42  0;1  1404 
schooling_no  =1 if respondent has not graduated from school  qpsbil(a)    0.12  0.32  0;1  1404 
schooling_hi  =1 if respondent has a high school degree  qpsbil(a)    0.17  0.38  0;1  1404 
number of children number of children in household  qkzahl    0.96  1.16  0;8  1404 
car  =1 if respondent has access to a car for personal use  qp06    0.72  0.45  0;1  1404 
wage  Average monthly net labor income in Euro in 2000  labnet00    1178.54  967.55  0;8180.64 
 
1404 
density  population density in respondents region of residence  -    582.12  635.08  56;3793  1404 
               
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES FOR CITIZEN (EQUATION 3)             
marriedgerman  =1 if respondent has a German wife  qp140    0.15  0.36  0;1  1404 
xenophobia  =1 if respondent worries about xenophobia in Germany  qp11809    0.30  0.46  0;1  1393 
feelgood  self reported overall satisfaction with life  qp14301    7.02  1.80  0;10  1404 
feeldisplaced  =1 if respondent feels alien both in host and home country  qp132    0.14  0.35  0;1  1178 
feelbackhome  =1 if respondent’s time to acclimatize in home country is short  qp137    0.50  0.50  0;1  1103 
feeldiscriminated  =1 if respondent experienced discrimination due to origin  qp127    0.49  0.50  0;1  1180 
aussiedler  =1 if respondent is an ethnic German  biimgrp00    0.10  0.31  0;1  1404 
guest worker  =1 if respondent belongs to the ‘guest worker subsample’  psample    0.39  0.49  0;1  1404 
i90  =1 if respondent immigrated between 1980 and 1990  immiyear   0.18  0.39  0;1  1404 
i00  =1 if respondent immigrated between 1990 and 2000  immiyear   0.39  0.49  0;1  1404 
NOTE: The summary statistics given above are based on the set union of all observations used in at least one of the estimated models presented in 
this paper. In order to save space the constant and dummy variables capturing missing values of remittances, years since migration, language 
proficiency, source country specific variables, and the self reported feelings on Germany are not reported (available upon request).  
 
 
4.  Econometric Issues 
Since ownership and German citizenship are supposed to be endogenous variables, we specify a three 
equation model that allows for endogeneity. All endogenous variables are binary. Thus, linear regression 
equations for these variables are not appropriate. As usual we define the binary variables as indicators 
for a latent tendency and explain the latent tendencies via linear regression equations. To be more 
precise, let  1 y ,  2 y , and  3 y  be the dummy indicators for (intended or realized) return, ownership, and 
German  citizenship  and 
*
1 y , 
*
2 y ,  and 
*
3 y  the  corresponding  latent  tendencies.  Furthermore,  all 
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    
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We  partly  use  different  exogenous  variables  in  the  three  equations  in  order  to  strengthen  the 
identification of the system (3). - 11 - 
 
In multiple equation models with endogenous binary variables either the endogenous binary variables 
themselves  or  the  latent tendencies  can  be  used  as  regressors (type  II  versus  type  I modeling,  see 
Blundell  and  Smith  (1993)  for  an  overview).  As  discussed  above,  we  argue  that  individual  return 
migration decisions are rather determined by the existence of host country specific capital than the mere 
proneness to accumulate it. Therefore, a so-called type II specification with the actually observed binary 
variables on the right hand side is appropriate. Furthermore, since economic theory suggests a recursive 
model  structure,  as  discussed  above,  the  problem of  logical  inconsistency  common  to some  type  II 
specifications does not arise (see Wilde (2001) for a more detailed discussion of logical consistency and 
its implications for the model structure). 
In model (3) endogeneity is equivalent to a non-zero correlation between the disturbances of the three 
equations. We will test this with a likelihood ratio test to clarify whether endogeneity is a statistically 
significant problem or not. Furthermore, we make use of the standard assumptions for the vector ui = 
(u1i, u2i, u3i)’ of disturbances given the vector xi of all exogenous variables, i.e. 




i i 12 2 23 i k i
2
13 23 3
u |x N 0, , , Cov u , u |x 0 i k, i,k 1, ,N
   

         
     
                if    with  ~  
The assumption of uncorrelated vectors of disturbances of different individuals is not restrictive because 
we estimate a cross-section of our data set. 
It is well known that the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) is asymptotically efficient. Since we use a 
large data set, we can make use of this efficiency. However, optimizing a (log)likelihood function based 
on a trivariate normal distribution is still computationally burdensome. Therefore, we use the Maximum 
Simulated Likelihood Estimator (MSLE), where the unknown probabilities are replaced by the mean of R 
simulated probabilities. If N, R   and  NR   0, the MSLE is asymptotically equivalent to the MLE.
 
11 Different methods for the simulation have been proposed in the literature. The most accurate one 
seems to be the GHK simulator (Greene (2008)), which we use. A crucial point is choosing R. Although 
Börsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993) found in the simulation studies of their seminal paper that even R 
= 20 leads to a negligible bias, we need a higher R to get stable results. Additionally, a higher R involves 
higher efficiency. We choose R = 10000. 
Concerning the  realized  returns  panel  attrition  may  be  an  issue.  This  is  usually  dealt with  by  using 
multinomial models (e.g. Constant and Massey (2003)). However, until now a combination of type II 





                                                           
11 Cameron and Trivedi (2005), chap. 12.4.2, the last condition is only needed for efficiency and not for consistency. - 12 - 
 
5.  Results and Sensitivity Analysis 
We estimate the models specified in Equation (1a) and (1b) allowing for endogeneity as discussed in 
section 2 and 4.
12 We perform a number of Wald-Tests, given at the bottom of Table 2, indicating the 
high statistical relevance of all specifications considered in this study. Generally our results show that the 
occurrence of the problem of endogeneity depends on the dependent variable used. Endogeneity only 
becomes an issue if we  make use of return intentions on the left hand side as can be seen from the 
Wald-Tests at the bottom of Table 2 referring to the Null -Hypothesis of no  correlation between the 
residuals of different equations in system (3).
13 The same Wald-Tests performed with actual returns on 
the left hand side of the system (3)  never resulted in a p-value below 0.2769.
 14 This could reflect the 
notably theoretical difference between both measurement concepts. Since it refers to the following 
years, actual remigration is less determined by factors related to the amount of country specific capital 
in period t not controlled for in the model than the return intention in this period. Therefore, considering 
realized returns, estimating an ordinary multinomial logit model is superior. In what follows regarding 
realized returns we refer to the results of a multinomial logit model whereas the results  regarding 
intended returns stem from the recursive three equation type II probit model discussed in chapter 4.
15 
To begin with we refer to the first four columns of Table 2 where we test the weak and the strong 
hypothesis by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) using intended returns as well as the actual return decision. At 
first let us turn to the weak hypothesis stated above and formalized in Equation (1a). 
The weak hypothesis 
As pointed out in section 2 the weak hypothesis by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) states that the effect of 
skills on return migration is determined by the type of selection process at hand and therefore is country 
specific. The parameter estimates for the weak hypothesis (H1) formalized in Equation (1a) for both 
endogeneous variables and estimation techniques are given in the first two columns of Table 2. In order 
to  test  this  hypothesis  we  conduct  a  Likelihood-Ratio  Test  which  tests  the  Null  Hypothesis  of  no 
differences in skill effects between source countries. That is, all parameters  , Wj   equal zero. We can 
reject the Null for intended returns and actual returns with p-values of 0.0016 and 0.0000, respectively. 
These results strongly support the weak Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) hypothesis. 
The strong hypothesis 
The strong hypothesis (H2) formalized in Equation (1b) adds empirical content to the weak one by stating 
the direction of the impact of skills on remigration depending on the type of  the selection process 
observed. Altogether we estimate four models using both concepts of T indicating the type of selection 
                                                           
12 We make use of the STATA routine ‘triprobit’ written by Terracol (2002). The reported results are based on 
robust standard errors.  
13 According to Equation (4) the Null Hypothesis can be formalized as:  0 12 13 23 H :  0     . 
14 The entire results of all estimations not reported in the paper are available from the authors upon request. 
15 The parameter estimates for the unspecified dropout alter native in the case of the multinomial logit model as 
well as the estimation results for the second and third equation of the recursive three -equation probit model are 
given in the appendix. - 13 - 
 
process at hand for both endogenous variables considered in our inquiry. Since both concepts of T show 
the same results we focus on the results for the more ambitious metrically one. The parameter estimates 
for the strong hypothesis are presented in the third and fourth column of Table 2. According to Borjas’ 
and Bratsberg’s (1996) theory we expect to find a positively signed parameter for the interaction of skills 
and T. For realized returns the results show the expected sign. Hence, the higher the return to skills in 
the source country relative to Germany the larger is the impact of skills on remigration. In the case of 
negative selection higher education fosters outmigration whereas in the case of positive selection higher 
educated individuals are discouraged to remigrate. This finding is significant at the five percent level. 
Concerning the intended returns no significance can be shown. 
Control Variables 
Regarding the control variables our findings are in line with previous literature and as theoretically 
expected. Especially the estimated effects of individual investment in host country attached capital on 
return intentions are significantly negative. The insignificance of locally tied capital on realized returns 
seems to reflect the fact that during a period of seven years the mobility discouraging effect of that 
investment is weakened. Nonetheless the sign is as expected. 
One result deserves closer attention. According to Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) we expect to find a 
negative impact of the distance to the immigrant’s home country. To the contrary we find a positive 
effect of distance on return intentions. We suggest a broader approach to think about geographical 
distance. Besides the cost of moving the geographical distance may reflect the cultural distance and, 
hence, may capture the unobserved cost of living in a culturally more distinct society. In the long run, 
associated with the realized return measure, both costs seem to outweigh each other resulting in no 
significant effect. In the short run, instead, a kind of homesickness may be more relevant causing the 
significant positive effect. 
Comparison with previous research and robustness check 
In this subsection of our paper we discuss the sensitivity of our results with respect to different model 
specifications and relate them to previous literature. First of all, the empirical evidence in favor of the 
weak hypothesis stated above proves to be robust regarding the different endogenous variables used. 
For  the  strong  hypothesis  the  empirical  evidence  depends  on  the  endogenous  variable  considered. 
Nonetheless we find some evidence supporting the strong hypothesis by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996). In 
general,  our  main  findings  remain  stable  across  different  endogenous  variables  and  estimation 
techniques.
16 
As  mentioned  a bove  using  different  estimation  methods  as  well  as  endogenous  variables  many 
aforementioned micro-level studies do not find a significant effect of skills on remigration. This seems to 
contradict  the  importance  attached  by  Borjas  and  Bratsberg  (1996)  to  th e  impact  of  skills  on 
outmigration. In order to shed some light on this issue we reestimate our models specifying the effect of 
                                                           
16 Furthermore, since some observations may be classified as outliers we reestimated all models without them. All 
results presented below turn out to be robust to this kind of problem. - 14 - 
 
skills on remigration in the way commonly done in previous literature. As can be seen in the fifth and the 
sixth column of Table 2 the insignificance of education seems to be induced by this restrictive way in 
which the impact of skills is commonly formalized. Since the impact of skills depends on the type of 
selection process at hand we do not observe an overall skill effect on outmigration.  
 - 15 - 
 
Table 2: Estimation Results 
    Weak Hypothesis    Strong Hypothesis    Previous Literature 
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLE  Intended Returns    Realized Returns    Intended Returns    Realized Returns    Intended Returns    Realized Returns 
    coefficient  p-value    coefficient  p-value    coefficient  p-value    coefficient  p-value    coefficient  p-value    coefficient  p-value 
                                      COUNTRY-SKILL INTERACTIONS                                   
education    -0.0305  0.464   0.4099  0.002   0.0009  0.974    -0.1453  0.059   0.0116  0.644   -0.0639  0.335 
educ x france (base: turkey)  0.1748  0.420   -0.0349  0.940   -  -    -  -   -  -    -  - 
educ x great britain    0.0268  0.785    8.9952  0.981   -  -    -  -   -  -    -  - 
educ x greece    -0.0518  0.471    -0.7396  0.005   -  -    -  -   -  -    -  - 
educ x italy    -0.1164  0.132    -0.7916  0.001   -  -    -  -   -  -    -  - 
educ x kasakhstan    -0.3099  0.020   -  -   -  -    -  -   -  -    -  - 
educ x poland    0.0856  0.394   -0.2569  0.444   -  -    -  -   -  -    -  - 
educ x romania    -0.0940  0.614   0.2860  0.567   -  -    -  -   -  -    -  - 
educ x spain    -0.0869  0.493   -0.3510  0.246   -  -    -  -   -  -    -  - 
educ x usa    0.5560  0.012   -1.0412  0.019   -  -    -  -   -  -    -  - 
educ x africa    -0.5237  0.011   -0.6255  0.294   -  -    -  -   -  -    -  - 
educ x benelux    0.0991  0.583   7.2662  0.981   -  -    -  -   -  -    -  - 
educ x ex-yugoslavia    0.1204  0.065   -0.9050  0.000   -  -    -  -   -  -    -  - 
educ x south america    -  -   -0.5705  0.154   -  -    -  -   -  -    -  - 
educ x other    0.1584  0.012   -0.4797  0.017   -  -    -  -   -  -    -  - 
T x educ    -  -    -  -   0.0307  0.409    0.3586  0.015   -  -    -  - 
ENDOGENOUS REGRESSORS                                   
citizen    -1.0069  0.043   -0.9644  0.167   -1.0358  0.029    -1.0519  0.125   -0.9985  0.029   -1.0390  0.114 
own house    -1.0968  0.040   -0.4823  0.215   -1.0803  0.067    -0.3556  0.329   -1.1130  0.043   -0.3681  0.311 
COUNTRY-SPECIFIC CONTROLS                                   
GNP/capita    0.0062  0.339   0.0264  0.195   0.0092  0.222    0.0292  0.166   0.0084  0.205   0.0019  0.901 
rule of law    -0.0141  0.739   -0.0682  0.010   -0.0122  0.784    -0.0672  0.007   -0.0154  0.707   -0.0826  0.001 
distance    0.0001  0.009   0.0002  0.173   0.0001  0.038    0.0000  0.886   0.0001  0.007   0.0002  0.188 
INDIVIUAL-SPECIFIC CONTROLS                                   
age    -0.0260  0.360   -0.0412  0.637   -0.0306  0.284    -0.0525  0.532   -0.0309  0.274   -0.0458  0.579 
age2    0.0003  0.429   0.0007  0.465   0.0004  0.286    0.0008  0.397   0.0004  0.276   0.0007  0.435 
remitsum    0.0001  0.007   0.0000  0.515   0.0001  0.010    0.0001  0.295   0.0001  0.010   0.0001  0.312 
remitno    -0.0586  0.684   -0.5211  0.288   -0.0950  0.515    -0.1326  0.771   -0.0955  0.510   -0.0618  0.891 
healthgood    -0.2523  0.010   0.5385  0.106   -0.2030  0.039    0.5442  0.087   -0.2037  0.038   0.5308  0.091 
healthbad    -0.1879  0.195   -0.4136  0.376   -0.1280  0.359    -0.3397  0.455   -0.1273  0.360   -0.2809  0.530 
ysm    0.0057  0.565   -0.0572  0.003   0.0055  0.555    -0.0561  0.002   0.0052  0.566   -0.0551  0.002 
children    0.1041  0.366   0.1053  0.756   0.1482  0.182    0.1568  0.633   0.1495  0.175   0.0943  0.771 
unemployed    0.0185  0.912   0.9222  0.080   0.0873  0.604    1.0705  0.029   0.0799  0.630   1.0959  0.025 - 16 - 
 
Table 2: (continued) 
    Weak Hypothesis    Strong Hypothesis    Previous Literature 
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLE  Intended Returns    Realized Returns    Intended Returns    Realized Returns    Intended Returns    Realized Returns 
    coefficient  p-value    coefficient  p-value    coefficient  p-value    coefficient  p-value    coefficient  p-value    coefficient  p-value 
                                 partner_german    0.1145  0.385   -1.6898  0.001   0.0629  0.624    -1.6938  0.001   0.0611  0.632   -1.6182  0.001 
partner_no    0.1427  0.385   0.6293  0.164   0.1380  0.402    0.5386  0.214   0.1377  0.401   0.4761  0.266 
partner_different    0.2196  0.174   -0.0050  0.993   0.2127  0.203    0.0176  0.973   0.2094  0.207   0.1905  0.700 
partner_separated    -0.0063  0.979   -0.4019  0.590   0.0444  0.846    -0.1750  0.792   0.0484  0.832   0.0658  0.919 
prestige    0.0060  0.145   -0.0058  0.661   0.0074  0.062    0.0035  0.771   0.0073  0.064   0.0065  0.588 
readgerman    -0.3825  0.000   -0.5882  0.096   -0.3974  0.000    -0.7182  0.036   -0.3941  0.000   -0.7951  0.019 
speakgerman    -0.2152  0.054   -0.4770  0.237   -0.2354  0.033    -0.5198  0.178   -0.2324  0.035   -0.4506  0.237 
SOURCE-COUNTRY DUMMIES                                   
france (base: turkey)    -1.5541  0.531   -0.2550  0.964   0.4444  0.344    1.2710  0.291   0.3574  0.424   0.8966  0.439 
great britain    -0.3218  0.794   -151.1389  0.980   -0.1765  0.675    -1.7295  0.239   -0.2239  0.580   -1.4734  0.305 
greece    1.0065  0.191   6.7026  0.012   0.4673  0.091    0.4613  0.580   0.3818  0.117   0.1241  0.869 
italy    1.3074  0.106   6.7656  0.007   0.1559  0.595    -0.3854  0.666   0.1084  0.688   -0.2970  0.727 
kasakhstan    2.2044  0.145   -  -   -0.6740  0.175    -  -   -0.8255  0.063   -  - 
poland    -0.8560  0.499   -0.0330  0.994   0.1895  0.616    -1.3405  0.265   0.0714  0.837   -2.3166  0.046 
romania    1.2853  0.570   -4.7337  0.495   0.3213  0.511    1.7468  0.162   0.1457  0.739   0.0182  0.987 
spain    1.3040  0.297   2.4555  0.425   0.4913  0.160    -0.2707  0.797   0.4148  0.198   -0.4452  0.655 
usa    -7.4734  0.009   10.2794  0.086   -0.3141  0.646    -1.9337  0.278   -0.3618  0.571   -0.9958  0.509 
africa    5.5791  0.008   7.3628  0.306   0.2921  0.419    -1.8972  0.472   0.2171  0.520   0.3962  0.788 
benelux    -0.7836  0.752   -132.3133  0.981   0.3423  0.545    0.2528  0.872   0.2463  0.652   -0.9867  0.581 
ex-yugoslavia    -0.9273  0.160   9.3803  0.000   0.4091  0.099    2.1346  0.009   0.2629  0.139   0.5691  0.295 
south america    -  -    6.3157  0.216   -  -    -0.3413  0.847   -  -   0.4757  0.746 
other    -1.6204  0.026   4.0539  0.089   0.1797  0.490    0.4470  0.605   0.0818  0.713   -0.4390  0.571 
RESIDUAL CORRELATION COEFF.                                  
rho12    0.5493  0.043   -  -   0.470  0.064    -  -   0.4695  0.054   -  - 
rho13    0.4698  0.179   -  -   0.461  0.236    -  -   0.4838  0.185   -  - 
rho23    0.0422  0.798   -  -   0.063  0.696    -  -   0.0633  0.693   -  - 
                                          test statistic  p-value    teststatistic  p-value    teststatistic  p-value    teststatistic  p-value    teststatistic  p-value    teststatistic  p-value 
Wald Test: Residual Corr.  11.27 (3)  0.010    -  -    9.26 (3)  0.026    -  -    9.65 (3)  0.022    -  - 
LR-Test: educ x country  33.13 (13)  0.001    49.74 (13)  0.000    -  -    -  -    -  -    -  - 
OVERALL SIGNIFICANCE  803.72 (78)  0.000   387.39 (106)  0.000    710.36 (65)  0.000    349.27 (80)  0.000    712.00 (65)  0.000    337.64 (80)  0.000 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS  1166    1383    1166    1383    1166    1383 
NOTE: IN THE CASE OF INTENDED RETURNS THE ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR EQUATION TWO AND THREE ARE GIVEN IN TABLE 3 IN THE APPENDIX, THE RESULTS FOR ALTERNATIVE 2 OF THE MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATION ARE PRESENTED IN TABLE 
4 IN THE APPENDIX, COUNTRY BASE GROUP IS TURKEY, THE CONSTANT AND DUMMY VARIABLES INDICATING MISSING OBSERVATIONS FOR REMITTANCES, YSM, SPEAKGERMAN, READGERMAN, CONTEXT DATA AND THE INTERACTION TERM OF 
EDUCATION AND MISSING GINI-COEFFICIENTS ARE NOT REPORTED  - 17 - 
 
6.  Conclusion 
More than ten years after the seminal paper by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) modeling the impact of skills 
on remigration the empirical evidence on that theory is still mixed. This paper sheds light on that issue. 
We deduct two hypotheses from Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) theory, a weak one and a strong one. The 
weak  hypothesis  states  that  the  skill  effect  on  remigration  is  country  specific  whereas  the  strong 
hypothesis additionally argues that the impact of skills on remigration depends on the ratio of return to 
skills in the source country relative to the host country. Using the GSOEP supplemented with several 
context variables we test the hypotheses by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) separately while allowing for 
endogeneity of host country specific capital. To our knowledge this is the first study formalizing and 
testing the hypotheses stated by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) in this direct way using micro-level data. 
In general, our findings give strong support for the theory by Borjas and Bratsberg (1996). Our main 
results prove to be robust to the different endogenous variables and estimation techniques employed. 
Yet, on closer inspection our inquiry also shows the remarkable differences resulting from the quite 
distinct theoretical measurement concepts connected with intended and realized returns. For example, 
the problem of endogeneity, the impact of distance between the host and source country, the effects of 
host country specific capital as well as the political stability depend on the endogenous variable used. 
Finally, a sensitivity analysis shows that the insignificance of education reported in previous studies is 
due to the negligence of country specific skill effects in the empirical tests commonly conducted and 
should not be interpreted as falsification of Borjas’ and Bratsberg’s (1996) theory. 
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Table 3: Estimation Results for Equations (2) and (3) 
   
Weak Hypothesis 
 
Strong Hypothesis    Previous Literature 
              ENDOGENOUS VARIABLE    Own House (Equation 2) 
    coefficient  p-value    coefficient  p-value    coefficient  p-value 
                  ENDOGENOUS REGRESSORS                 
citizen    0.2220  0.147    0.2045  0.178    0.2041  0.177 
CONTROL VARIABLES                 
age     0.0173  0.000    0.0174  0.000    0.0174  0.000 
INSTRUMENTS                 
married    -0.0435  0.752    -0.0431  0.758    -0.0412  0.767 
schooling_no    -0.3077  0.047    -0.3321  0.052    -0.3350  0.046 
schooling_hi    0.4258  0.001    0.4315  0.001    0.4326  0.001 
density    -0.0002  0.077    -0.0002  0.068    -0.0002  0.069 
number of children    0.1403  0.001    0.1401  0.001    0.1399  0.001 
car    0.3689  0.001    0.3697  0.001    0.3698  0.001 
wage    0.0002  0.000    0.0002  0.002    0.0002  0.002 
                   
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLE    Citizen (Equation 3) 
    coefficient  p-value    coefficient  p-value    coefficient  p-value 
CONTROL VARIABLES                 
unemployed 
 
  0.2572  0.073    0.2509  0.085    0.2509  0.085 
rule of law 
 
  0.0902  0.000    0.0933  0.000    0.0932  0.000 
INSTRUMENTS                 
marriedgerman    -0.6661  0.004    -0.6621  0.006    -0.6619  0.006 
xenophobia    0.0446  0.742    0.0386  0.781    0.0383  0.782 
feelgood    0.1591  0.000    0.1568  0.000    0.1574  0.000 
feeldisplaced    -0.6209  0.001    -0.6227  0.002    -0.6231  0.002 
feelbackhome    -0.4103  0.003    -0.3893  0.005    -0.3886  0.005 
feeldiscriminated    -0.0323  0.792    -0.0404  0.744    -0.0375  0.762 
aussiedler    2.8761  0.000    2.8732  0.000    2.8699  0.000 
gastarbeiter    -1.2089  0.000    -1.2403  0.000    -1.2376  0.000 
i90    2.7234  0.000    2.7391  0.000    2.7406  0.000 
i00    2.7335  0.000    2.7452  0.000    2.7457  0.000 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS  1166 
1166 
1166 
NOTE: THE CONSTANT AND DUMMY VARIABLES INDICATING MISSING OBSERVATIONS FOR YSM, SELF REPORTED FEELINGS ON GERMANY, AND 
AUSSIEDLER ARE NOT REPORTED (AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST). 
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Table 4: Estimation Results for the Multinomial Logit Model (alternative 2: unspecified dropout) 
   
Weak Hypothesis 
 
Strong Hypothesis    Previous Literature 
                    ENDOGENOUS VARIABLE    Realized Returns (alternative 2: unspecified dropout) 
    coefficient  p-value    coefficient  p-value    coefficient  p-value 
                    INDIVIUAL-SPECIFIC CONTROLS                 
age    0.0195  0.653    0.0162  0.708    0.0181  0.674 
age2    -0.0004  0.459    -0.0004  0.488    -0.0004  0.457 
remitsum    0.0000  0.121    0.0001  0.122    0.0000  0.127 
remitno    -0.1679  0.416    -0.1486  0.473    -0.1529  0.460 
healthgood    -0.0304  0.839    -0.0402  0.786    -0.0374  0.800 
healthbad    -0.1526  0.478    -0.1325  0.535    -0.1346  0.528 
ysm    0.0118  0.209    0.0127  0.174    0.0128  0.168 
employment    -0.0486  0.842    -0.0482  0.842    -0.0599  0.805 
partner_german    -0.1454  0.470    -0.1613  0.416    -0.1604  0.418 
partner_different    0.0911  0.717    0.0379  0.878    0.0429  0.862 
partner_separated    0.3327  0.295    0.3015  0.340    0.3203  0.310 
partner_no    0.2351  0.320    0.2190  0.351    0.2146  0.360 
prestige    -0.0013  0.823    -0.0007  0.905    -0.0010  0.866 
readgerman    -0.1529  0.368    -0.1451  0.387    -0.1409  0.400 
speakgerman    -0.0567  0.719    -0.0647  0.680    -0.0597  0.703 
children    -0.1227  0.435    -0.1283  0.410    -0.1374  0.377 
citizen    -0.1982  0.401    -0.2054  0.384    -0.2170  0.349 
property    0.3144  0.041    0.3183  0.038    0.3104  0.043 
COUNTRY-SPECIFIC CONTROLS                 
GNP/capita    0.0052  0.570    0.0038  0.658    0.0035  0.688 
rule of law    0.0046  0.535    0.0019  0.802    0.0040  0.586 
distance    0.0001  0.271    0.0001  0.441    0.0001  0.329 
COUNTRY-SKILL INTERACTIONS                 
education    0.0243  0.703    -0.0507  0.159    -0.0367  0.264 
educ x france    1.4455  0.805    -  -    -  - 
educ x great britain    -0.8017  0.829    -  -    -  - 
educ x greece    0.6287  0.685    -  -    -  - 
educ x italy    1.7046  0.224    -  -    -  - 
educ x poland    1.4815  0.239    -  -    -  - 
educ x romania    -0.3132  0.894    -  -    -  - 
educ x spain    -2.7682  0.250    -  -    -  - 
educ x usa    -2.5209  0.608    -  -    -  - 
educ x africa    3.4698  0.110    -  -    -  - 
educ x benelux    2.1485  0.656    -  -    -  - 
educ x ex-yugoslavia    1.4348  0.225    -  -    -  - 
educ x south america    0.0109  0.998    -  -    -  - 
educ x other    0.5685  0.554    -  -    -  - 
T x educ    -  -    0.0528  0.323    -  - 
SOURCE-COUNTRY DUMMIES                 
france    -0.1528  0.766    0.0679  0.933    -0.0527  0.947 
great britain    0.0217  0.943    -0.2769  0.712    -0.3177  0.671 
greece    -0.1197  0.417    -0.4163  0.366    -0.5239  0.237 




Table 4: (continued) 
   
Weak Hypothesis 
 
Strong Hypothesis    Previous Literature 
                    ENDOGENOUS VARIABLE    Realized Returns (alternative 2: unspecified dropout) 
    coefficient  p-value    coefficient  p-value    coefficient  p-value 
                    poland    -0.0492  0.643    1.0948  0.004    1.0155  0.005 
romania    0.0375  0.846    0.4646  0.357    0.2694  0.557 
spain    0.2082  0.372    -0.5906  0.326    -0.6767  0.254 
usa    0.0831  0.798    -0.8710  0.393    -0.8532  0.406 
africa    -0.2328  0.181    0.8405  0.126    0.7816  0.139 
benelux    -0.2469  0.518    -0.7227  0.497    -0.7294  0.463 
ex-yugoslavia    -0.1618  0.158    0.0324  0.925    -0.2041  0.405 
south america    -0.0760  0.811    -0.7754  0.434    -0.6595  0.493 
other    -0.0453  0.595    0.3825  0.293    0.1993  0.516 
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS  1383 
1383 
1383 
NOTE:  THE CONSTANT AND DUMMY VARIABLES INDICATING MISSING OBSERVATIONS FOR REMITTANCES, YSM, SPEAKGERMAN, READGERMAN, 
AND CONTEXT DATA ARE NOT REPORTED (AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST). 